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THE MCCARRAN AMENDMENT AND GROUNDWATER: 
WHY WASHINGTON STATE SHOULD REQUIRE 
INCLUSION OF GROUNDWATER IN GENERAL 
STREAM ADJUDICATIONS INVOLVING FEDERAL 
RESERVED WATER RIGHTS 
Aubri Goldsby 
Abstract: All water is connected through the hydrologic cycle.1 When a farmer pumps 
water from an underground aquifer to irrigate crops, that act may affect a family relying on a 
nearby surface water stream for its water supply. Despite the scientific link between surface 
and groundwater,2 the law often treats the two separately.3 The legal choice to ignore the 
interaction of surface and groundwater is particularly notable in “general stream 
adjudications.” States file these large-scale lawsuits against users in a particular stream or 
waterbody to determine, in a single lawsuit, all the rights existing in that water source.4 In 
1952, Congress passed the McCarran Amendment, which allows states to adjudicate federal 
reserved water rights in state court in general stream adjudications.5 The United States 
Supreme Court has interpreted the Amendment as requiring that adjudications be 
“comprehensive” of all of the rights in a given water source, but has not yet ruled as to 
whether this requires inclusion of groundwater users.6 The Amendment itself is equally 
vague on this point. This Comment argues against Ninth Circuit precedent and asserts that 
for a general stream adjudication to be “comprehensive” under the McCarran Amendment, it 
must include users of hydrologically connected surface and groundwater. 
INTRODUCTION 
The federal government has water rights in all waters set aside for a 
federal purpose.
7
 Many states seek to delineate the size and scope of 
                                                      
1. 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 18.02 (Robert E. Beck & Amy L. Kelly eds., 3d ed. 
LexisNexis/Matthew Bender 2009). 
2. Id. 
3. Id. (describing how courts sometimes apply different methods to quantify rights in surface 
water and groundwater). 
4. Robert T. Anderson, Indian Water Rights and the Federal Trust Responsibility, 46 NAT. 
RESOURCES J. 399, 421 (2006). 
5. See McCarran Amendment, ch. 651, 66 Stat. 560 (1952) (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 666(a) 
(2006)). 
6. Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 618, 626 (1963). 
7. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976) (“This Court has long held that when the 
Federal Government withdraws its land from the public domain and reserves it for a federal 
purpose, the Government, by implication, reserves appurtenant water then unappropriated to the 
extent needed to accomplish the purpose of the reservation.”); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 
564, 577 (1908). 
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these “reserved rights” to determine what waters are available for state 
users.
8
 The most common way of resolving federal and state water rights 
claims is through general stream adjudications.
9
 General stream 
adjudications allow states to determine all rights to a given water source 
in a single lawsuit. In order to make these adjudications more efficient, 
Congress passed the McCarran Amendment.
10
 
The McCarran Amendment waives federal sovereign immunity, 
enabling states to include federal water rights in general stream 
adjudications.
11
 In order for the waiver to take effect, however, the 
adjudication must be sufficiently “comprehensive.”
12
 All claimants to a 
water source must be included in the adjudication to meet the 
comprehensiveness requirement.
13
 The adjudication must be more than a 
mere attempt by private parties to establish their water rights with 
respect to the federal government.
14
 
The United States may challenge a state’s general stream 
adjudication.
15
 Specifically, the United States may move to dismiss an 
adjudication on the grounds that it is insufficiently comprehensive to 
support a waiver of federal sovereign immunity.
16
 And while the United 
States Supreme Court has never decided whether an adjudication must 
include groundwater users connected to a surface water source in order 
to be considered comprehensive, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has 
answered this question in the negative. In United States v. Oregon,
17
 the 
Ninth Circuit held that a general stream adjudication need not include 
groundwater users to be comprehensive under the McCarran 
Amendment.
18
 This Comment asserts that the Ninth Circuit’s decision 
                                                      
8. See, e.g., In re Gen. Adjudication of Gila River Sys., 989 P.2d 739, 745 (Ariz. 1999); In re 
Gen. Adjudication of the Big Horn Sys., 753 P.2d 76, 99–100 (Wyo. 1988). 
9. See John E. Thorson et al., Dividing Western Waters: A Century of Adjudicating Rivers and 
Streams, Part II, 9 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 299, 331–37 (2006) [hereinafter Thorson, Dividing 
Western Waters II]. 
10. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 819 (1976). 
11. 43 U.S.C. § 666(a) (2006); see infra Part II (detailing the passage, purpose, and effect of the 
McCarran Amendment). 
12. Thomas H. Pacheco, How Big Is Big? The Scope of Water Rights Suits Under the McCarran 
Amendment, 15 ECOLOGY L.Q. 627, 643 (1988) (discussing Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 617–19 
(1963)). 
13. Id. 
14. Dugan, 372 U.S. at 618, 626. 
15. United States v. Dist. Court in and for the Cnty. of Eagle Colo., 401 U.S. 520, 522 (1971). 
16. United States v. Oregon, 44 F.3d 758, 768 (9th Cir. 1994). 
17. Id. 
18. Id. 
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was incorrect. In addition to being incorrect as a matter of law, the 
practical consequences that may result argue for the inclusion of both 
surface and groundwater in general stream adjudications. Because states 
have the power to determine their own adjudication procedures, 
Washington should not follow Ninth Circuit precedent when 
adjudicating federal water rights. 
Part I of this Comment explains the doctrine of federal reserved water 
rights and the rights the federal government and Indian tribes maintain in 
the waters within a state.
19
 Part II explains the McCarran Amendment 
and analyzes the United States Supreme Court’s treatment of the 
Amendment’s comprehensiveness requirement. It also details the 
importance of water to tribal communities and their hesitancy to have 
their water rights determined in state court. Part III discusses the concept 
of hydrologic comprehensiveness and the relationship between surface 
and groundwater. Part IV describes the Ninth Circuit’s decision in 
United States v. Oregon, where the court refused to require the inclusion 
of groundwater users for a waiver of federal sovereign immunity under 
the McCarran Amendment. Part V reviews Washington water law, 
including Washington’s recognition of hydraulic continuity
20
 between 
surface and groundwater. This Part explains the application of the 
principle of hydraulic continuity to state water rights conflicts and 
argues for its incorporation into disputes involving federal reserved 
water rights. Part V also discusses the general stream adjudication 
process in Washington. Finally, Part VI argues that the Washington State 
Supreme Court should require the inclusion of both surface and 
groundwater rights in general stream adjudications to satisfy the 
comprehensiveness requirement of the McCarran Amendment. 
                                                      
19. This Comment focuses primarily on tribal water rights within the overall scheme of federal 
reserved water rights. This focus predominates because tribes place great weight on water and 
generally desire to have their water rights adjudicated in federal court due to strained relations with 
the states. See Stephen M. Feldman, The Supreme Court’s New Sovereign Immunity Doctrine and 
the McCarran Amendment: Toward Ending State Adjudication of Indian Water Rights, 18 HARV. 
ENVT’L. L. REV. 433, 433 (1994). 
20. Washington State cases refer to a “hydraulic” connection between surface and groundwater as 
opposed to a “hydrologic” connection, but the two words are interchangeable in this context. 
Compare Postema v. Pollution Control Hearings Bd., 142 Wash. 2d 68, 86, 11 P.3d 726, 738 (2000) 
with Oregon, 44 F.3d at 768–69. 
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I. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAS RESERVED WATER 
RIGHTS IN LANDS REQUIRING WATER TO FULFILL THE 
PURPOSE FOR WHICH THE LANDS WERE SET ASIDE 
Federal reserved water rights have been recognized since the early 
twentieth century and form the basis for numerous water rights 
disputes.
21
 State adjudications of water rights often implicate federal 
claims. The reserved rights doctrine was developed in Winters v. United 
States
22
 and provides the federal government with a water right at the 
time land is set aside for a federal purpose—if necessary to fulfill that 
purpose.
23
 Modern treatment of the doctrine suggests that it should be 
extended to groundwater rights.
24
 
A. Winters v. United States Established the Federal Reserved Water 
Rights Doctrine, Which Applies to Both Tribal and Non-Tribal 
Lands 
Most federal water rights are secured through the reserved rights 
doctrine, which the United States Supreme Court established in 1908 in 
Winters v. United States.
25
 In Winters, the Court held that the Fort 
Belknap Indian Reservation had an implied water right dating back to 
the day the reservation was established.
26
 In determining that an implied 
water right existed, the Court looked at the purposes of the reservation,
27
 
the practical need for water,
28
 and Indian law canons of construction.
29
 
The Court held that the government’s purpose of moving tribes to 
reservations in hopes of turning them into a “pastoral” people 
necessarily required the recognition of water rights.
30
 Therefore, these 
                                                      
21. See Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908); Thorson, Dividing Western Waters II, 
supra note 9, at 323–24. 
22. Winters, 207 U.S. at 577. 
23. Id. at 576. 
24. See infra Part I.B. 
25. Winters, 207 U.S. at 564; COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 19.02, at 1172 
(Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds., 2005) [hereinafter COHEN]. 
26. Winters, 207 U.S. at 576; COHEN, supra note 25, § 19.02, at 1172. 
27. Winters, 207 U.S. at 576 (“It was the policy of the government, it was the desire of the 
Indians, to change those [nomadic] habits and to become a pastoral and civilized people.”). 
28. Id. (“The lands were arid, and, without irrigation, were practically valueless.”). 
29. Id. (“By a rule of interpretation of agreements and treaties with the Indians, ambiguities 
occurring will be resolved from the standpoint of the Indians.”); COHEN, supra note 25, § 19.02, at 
1172. 
30. Winters, 207 U.S. at 576. 
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rights did not have to be explicit in the treaty creating the reservation.
31
 
The Winters decision assured tribes enough water to carry out the 
purposes of the reservation, with a priority date
32
 reflecting the date on 
which the reservation was established.
33
 The Winters doctrine allows the 
federal government to implicitly reserve waters when it enters into 
treaties with Indian tribes.
34
 Initially, the Winters doctrine was thought to 
apply only to Indian lands.
35
 As a result, although western states 
recognized the Winters doctrine, they largely ignored it.
36
 
On the other hand, the U.S. Supreme Court has addressed the merits 
of the Winters doctrine as well as its application to non-tribal lands. The 
Court’s 1963 decision in Arizona v. California
37
 answered any questions 
about the doctrine’s vitality by extending the Winters doctrine to other, 
non-Indian, federal reservations of land.
38
 Under this framework, if 
Congress today reserved land for “a park, national forest, wildlife 
refuge, military base, or other use of public land without explicitly 
addressing water, the reservation of land implies Congress’ intention to 
reserve water sufficient to accomplish congressional purposes.”
39
 
Similar to Indian water rights reservations in Winters, the Court 
established that the priority date of these non-tribal federal reserved 
                                                      
31. COHEN, supra note 25, § 19.02, at 1172. A reservation created by executive order or statute 
also enjoys the same reserved water rights. Id. § 19.03[2][a], at 1176. 
32. The priority date of a water right establishes its place in temporal proximity to other rights. A 
right dated earlier (senior) to another right (junior) has priority over the other right. JOSEPH L. SAX 
ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 125–26 (4th ed. 2006). 
33. Winters, 207 U.S. at 572, 576–77; COHEN, supra note 25, § 19.03[1], at 1174. Winters rights 
are distinguishable from Winans rights, established in United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 
(1905), which are rights that are “necessarily and impliedly reserved by the tribes in order to give 
effect to their treaty rights.” COHEN, supra note 25, § 19.02, at 1172. For example, a Winans right to 
hunt or fish would imply sufficient water to continue this practice, and thus a Winans right preserves 
a pre-existing use of water, rather than creating a new use (such as the rights in Winters, which were 
set aside for the tribes to take up new agrarian pursuits). See United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 
1408–15 (9th Cir. 1983); COHEN, supra note 25, § 19.02, at 1173; 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, 
supra note 1, § 37.02(a)(2). 
34. John E. Thorson et al., Dividing Western Waters: A Century of Adjudicating Rivers and 
Streams, 8 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 355, 376 (2005) [hereinafter Thorson, Dividing Western 
Waters I]. 
35. Reed D. Benson, Deflating the Deference Myth: National Interests vs. State Authority Under 
Federal Laws Affecting Water Use, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 241, 265 (2006). 
36. Thorson, Dividing Western Waters I, supra note 34, at 460. 
37. 373 U.S. 546 (1963). 
38. Id. at 346; Thorson, Dividing Western Waters I, supra note 34, at 460. 
39. Thorson, Dividing Western Waters I, supra note 34, at 460. 
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rights is the date when the land is withdrawn from the public domain or 
reserved for a particular purpose.
40
 
In addition to expanding the scope of federal reserved water rights, 
Arizona v. California also established the “practicably irrigable acreage” 
(PIA) standard.
41
 This standard quantifies Indian reserved rights for 
agricultural purposes by looking at the irrigation capabilities of the land 
at a reasonable cost and allowing for a definite quantification of water 
rights that can be prioritized within the appropriation system.
42
 The 
standard troubled the western states, which contain the vast majority of 
Indian lands.
43
 With the large acreage of Indian lands in these states, 
there was a potential for extensive tribal claims to water.
44
 The PIA 
standard thus prompted states to begin large-scale water rights 
adjudications.
45
 
B. The Modern Trend Is to Recognize that the Reserved Water Rights 
Doctrine Applies to Groundwater 
The Winters doctrine refers only to surface waters, leaving uncertain 
whether there are federal reserved rights to groundwater.
46
 The United 
States Supreme Court addressed this question in 1976 in Cappaert v. 
United States.
47
 In that case, nearby groundwater pumping by farmers 
decreased the water in a part of Death Valley National Monument called 
Devil’s Hole—a deep cavern with an underground pool inhabited by a 
rare species of desert fish.
48
 The Court recognized that “when the 
Federal Government withdraws its land from public domain and reserves 
it for a federal purpose, the Government, by implication, reserves 
appurtenant water then unappropriated to the extent needed to 
                                                      
40. Id.  
41. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. at 601. 
42. Id. at 600–01; COHEN, supra note 25, § 19.03[5][b], at 1185–86.  
43. Thorson, Dividing Western Waters I, supra note 34, at 460. 
44. Id. In reality, the PIA standard often provides insufficient water for tribes with minimal 
irrigable acres but other important water needs. COHEN, supra note 25, § 19.03[5][b], at 1185. For 
more on the quantification of tribal waters for various uses, see Robert T. Anderson, Indian Water 
Rights, Practical Reasoning, and Negotiated Settlements, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1133, 1142–46, 1148–53 
(2010). 
45. Thorson, Dividing Western Waters I, supra note 34, at 460. 
46. 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 1, § 37.02(d) (“The principal unresolved issue 
concerning the scope of waters subject to reserved rights is whether groundwater may be claimed.”). 
At its most simplistic level, surface water is water existing above ground, such as lakes and rivers, 
while groundwater can be viewed as “all water beneath the surface of the earth.” Id. § 18.02. 
47. 426 U.S. 128 (1976). 
48. Id. at 131–33. 
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accomplish the purpose of the reservation.”
49
 In determining a 
reservation of water, the Court focused on the intent of the government 
in setting the land aside.
50
 Intent could be inferred where unappropriated 
waters would be necessary to fulfill the purposes for which the 
reservation was made.
51
 Even though the actual water in Devil’s Hole 
was surface water, the Court held that the United States could protect 
itself from damaging groundwater diversions.
52
 While Cappaert did not 
explicitly declare that federal reserved rights extend to groundwater,
53
 it 
has nevertheless served as a basis for recognizing federal groundwater 
rights in later cases.
54
 
The U.S. Supreme Court did not address tribal groundwater rights in 
Cappaert,
55
 but many state courts have extended Cappaert’s reasoning 
to these rights.
56
 The Arizona State Supreme Court was the first state 
supreme court to expressly acknowledge a tribal right to groundwater. In 
the Gila River general stream adjudication,
57
 the Arizona State Supreme 
Court limited the tribal right to groundwater to times when other sources 
were inadequate to meet the purposes of the reservation.
58
 The Montana 
State Supreme Court soon followed—holding that tribal reserved water 
rights extend to groundwater—but did not limit the right like the 
                                                      
49. Id. at 138 (stating further that this right vests on the date of the reservation and is superior to 
rights of subsequent appropriators). 
50. Id. at 139. 
51. Id. (finding that this intent existed for Devil’s Hole). 
52. Id. at 142–43 (“[G]roundwater and surface water are physically interrelated as integral parts 
of the hydrologic cycle.” (quoting C. CORKER, GROUNDWATER LAW, MANAGEMENT, AND 
ADMINISTRATION, NAT’L WATER COMM’N LEGAL STUDY NO. 6, xxiv (1971))). 
53. Thorson, Dividing Western Waters II, supra note 9, at 309. 
54. 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 1, § 37.02(d). 
55. Id. 
56. United States v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 375 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1058 (W.D. Wash. 2005); In 
re Gen. Adjudication of Gila River Sys., 989 P.2d 739, 745 (Ariz. 1999); Confederated Tribes of the 
Flathead Reservation v. Stultz, 59 P.3d 1093, 1098 (Mont. 2002). 
57. Gila River Sys., 989 P.2d at 745 (rejecting the previous decision by the Wyoming State 
Supreme Court to deny tribal rights to groundwater: “We can appreciate the hesitation of the Big 
Horn court to break new ground, but we do not find its reasoning persuasive”). The only court to 
rule on tribal rights to groundwater prior to Arizona was the Wyoming State Supreme Court in In re 
Gen. Adjudication of the Big Horn Sys., 753 P.2d 76, 99–100 (Wyo. 1988). In that case, the Court 
recognized that “[t]he logic which supports a reservation of surface water to fulfill the purpose of 
the reservation also supports reservation of groundwater,” but then refused to find that a tribal right 
to groundwater existed because no previous court had ever recognized the right. Id. 
58. Gila River Sys., 989 P.2d at 747–48; COHEN, supra note 25, § 19.03[2][b], at 1178; 2 
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 1, § 37.02(d). 
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Arizona court.
59
 In Washington, a federal district court upheld the 
Lummi Indian Nation’s reserved right to groundwater, also without 
limitation.
60
 As cases such as Cappaert and Gila River indicate, it 
appears that the modern trend in western states is to recognize tribal 
reserved rights to groundwater.
61
 
II. THE MCCARRAN AMENDMENT WAIVES FEDERAL 
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN COMPREHENSIVE STATE 
WATER RIGHTS ADJUDICATIONS 
After federal reserved water rights were recognized in Winters, states 
sought to delineate water rights within their boundaries through general 
stream adjudications.
62
 States were not comfortable with the unknown 
potential of tribal water rights claims and wanted to turn hypothetical 
rights into quantified rights.
63
 The federal government frustrated this 
scheme by regularly refusing to waive its sovereign immunity.
64
 
Congress attempted to remedy this problem by enacting the McCarran 
Amendment.
65
 The McCarran Amendment waives federal sovereign 
                                                      
59. Flathead Reservation, 59 P.3d at 1098; COHEN, supra note 25, § 19.03[2][b], at 1178; 2 
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 1, § 37.02(d). 
60. United States v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 375 F. Supp. 2d at 1058. This order was vacated 
due to a later settlement that allocated groundwater to the Lummi Peninsula portion of the Lummi 
Reservation. United States ex rel. Lummi Indian Nation v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, No. C01-
0047Z, 2007 WL 4190400 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 20, 2007); COHEN, supra note 25, § 19.03[2][b], at 
1178–79 (2009 Supp. at 127). 
61. See also COHEN, supra note 25, § 19.03[2][b], at 1177–78 (“Because of the hydrologic 
interrelationship of ground and surface waters, either source should be available to the extent 
necessary to satisfy the purposes of the reservation . . . . No reason has been advanced to exclude 
groundwater, while hydrology, logic, and, often, economics all prescribe that it should be included 
in the tribal right.”). 
62. General stream adjudications are lawsuits joining together all entities claiming a right to use 
water from a specific source in a single action to determine the rights and priorities for use of the 
water. JAMES K. PHARRIS & P. THOMAS MCDONALD, WASH. STATE OFFICE OF ATT’Y GEN., AN 
INTRODUCTION TO WASHINGTON WATER LAW, at IV:5 (Jan. 2000), available at 
http://www.atg.wa.gov/uploadedFiles/Home/About_the_Office/Divisions/Ecology/Intro%20WA%2
0Water%20Law.pdf [hereinafter PHARRIS]. 
63. Thorson, Dividing Western Waters I, supra note 34, at 460 (“The potential of large Indian 
reserved water right claims on all of the West’s major rivers sent shock waves through the region.”). 
64. Id. at 452–56. The basic meaning of sovereign immunity is that the sovereign, here the federal 
government, cannot be sued without its consent. Feldman, supra note 19, at 454. The doctrine of 
federal sovereign immunity originally appeared in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 411–
12 (1821), and was soon expressly affirmed by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. 
Clarke, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 463, 444 (1834). Feldman, supra note 19, at 455–56. Only an act of 
Congress, such as the McCarran Amendment, can waive federal sovereign immunity. Feldman, 
supra note 19, at 456. 
65. Feldman, supra note 19, at 456. 
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immunity in state general stream adjudications where the adjudication 
covers all users of a given water source.
66
 
A. Congress Enacted the McCarran Amendment in 1952 to Allow 
State Adjudications of Federal Water Rights, Including Tribal 
Water Rights 
In July 1952, Congress passed the McCarran Amendment, waiving 
federal sovereign immunity for adjudications of federal water rights.
67
 
Patrick McCarran, a United States senator from Nevada, opposed the 
federal government’s frequent refusal to litigate water rights in state 
courts.
68
 Senator McCarran sought to enable states to take control of 
their own water resources.
69
 By waiving federal sovereign immunity, his 
amendment paved the way for the modern general stream adjudication.
70
 
States have the authority to allocate and quantify the surface and 
groundwaters found within state boundaries.
71
 When federal reserved 
water rights are adjudicated in a state proceeding, state laws regarding 
the priority of water rights and the adjudication process apply.
72
 
The McCarran Amendment created concurrent state and federal 
jurisdiction over federal water rights controversies.
73
 In Colorado River 
                                                      
66. Id. 
67. McCarran Amendment, ch. 651, 66 Stat. 560 (1952) (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 666(a) (2006)). 
The text of the McCarran Amendment states:  
Consent is given to join the United States as a defendant in any suit (1) for the adjudication of 
rights to the use of water of a river system or other source, or (2) for the administration of such 
rights, where it appears that the United States is the owner of or is in the process of acquiring 
water rights by appropriation under State law, by purchase, by exchange, or otherwise, and the 
United States is a necessary party to such suit. The United States, when a party to any such 
suit, shall (1) be deemed to have waived any right to plead that the State laws are inapplicable 
or that the United States is not amendable thereto by reason of its sovereignty, and (2) shall be 
subject to the judgments, orders, and decrees of the court having jurisdiction, and may obtain 
review thereof, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like 
circumstances: Provided, That no judgment for costs shall be entered against the United States 
in any such suit.  
68. Thorson, Dividing Western Waters I, supra note 34, at 442–43. 
69. Id. at 443. 
70. Id. at 443, 458.  
71. 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 1, § 36.02 (“[A]s to the day-to-day actual 
governmental control of the rights to use the waters of the United States, Congress has left 
allocation decisions to the states” (citing California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement 
Co., 295 U.S. 142 (1935) as the “leading case summarizing the early statutes and cases and ratifying 
the states’ freedom to develop the water law rules of their choice”)); see also id. § 35 (describing 
situations where state authority yields to federal law, such as through the navigation servitude).  
72. 43 U.S.C. § 666(a) (2006) (“The United States, when a party to any such suit [adjudication], 
shall (1) be deemed to have waived any right to plead that the State laws are inapplicable.”). 
73. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 809 (1976). 
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Water Conservation District v. United States,
74
 the United States 
Supreme Court upheld a Colorado federal district court’s abstention 
from a tribal water rights case in favor of a concurrent state 
proceeding.
75
 Despite the heavy obligation on federal courts to exercise 
their jurisdiction,
76
 the Court pointed to multiple factors supporting the 
continuation of the suit in state court.
77
 These factors included the policy 
underlying the McCarran Amendment to prevent piecemeal adjudication 
of water rights.
78
 
In the same case, the U.S. Supreme Court also held that the McCarran 
Amendment extends to state adjudications of Indian water rights.
79
 In 
Colorado River, the Court noted that its previous cases concerning the 
McCarran Amendment did not distinguish between Indian and non-
Indian water rights.
80
 The Court additionally observed that the legislative 
history of the Amendment evinced a clear understanding by both its 
proponents and opponents that it would include tribal water rights.
81
 
Later, in Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe,
82
 tribes argued that the 
McCarran Amendment waives only federal sovereign immunity and not 
tribal sovereign immunity, particularly in states that have enacted 
                                                      
74. Id. 
75. Id. at 820. 
76. Id. at 817–18 (stating that there is a “virtually unflagging obligation of the federal courts to 
exercise the jurisdiction given them”). 
77. Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 817, 819–20 (stating additional factors of “(a) the apparent absence 
of any proceedings in the District Court, other than the filing of the complaint, prior to the motion to 
dismiss, (b) the extensive involvement of state water rights occasioned by this suit naming 1,000 
defendants, (c) the 300-mile distance between the District Court in Denver and the court in Division 
7, and (d) the existing participation by the Government in Division 4, 5, and 6 proceedings”); see 
also Thorson, Dividing Western Waters II, supra note 9, at 359–63 (describing the status of both 
state and federal water rights cases following the McCarran Amendment and the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Colorado River). 
78. Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 817, 819–20; Thorson, Dividing Western Waters II, supra note 9, at 
359–63. 
79. Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 810–12; COHEN, supra note 25, § 19.05[1], at 1206. 
80. Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 810. 
81. Id. at 811. In 1983, the Supreme Court reiterated the congressional intent to avoid piecemeal 
litigation in favor of larger state court adjudications in Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe: 
The McCarran Amendment, as interpreted in Colo. River, allows and encourages state courts to 
undertake the task of quantifying Indian water rights in the course of comprehensive water 
adjudications. Although adjudication of those rights in federal court instead might in the 
abstract be practical, and even wise, it will be neither practical nor wise as long as it creates the 
possibility of duplicative litigation, tension and controversy between the federal and state 
forums, hurried and pressured decisionmaking, and confusion over the disposition of property 
rights. 
463 U.S. 545, 569 (1983).  
82. 463 U.S. 545 (1983).  
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enabling statutes giving the federal government absolute control over 
Indian lands.
83
 The Court agreed that the Amendment waived only 
federal sovereign immunity, but then left tribes with the choice either to 
allow the federal government to uphold their water rights as a trustee or 
to waive tribal sovereign immunity and intervene in the state court 
adjudications.
84
 The Court also held that states could quantify Indian 
water rights in general stream adjudications despite the existence of an 
enabling act disclaiming state jurisdiction.
85
 However, the Court asserted 
that it would scrutinize any allegations of abuse of Indian water rights in 
state courts.
86
 
Even though the McCarran Amendment provides an avenue for state 
determinations of federal water rights, tribes generally prefer 
determination of their rights in a federal forum.
87
 As Frank Tenorio, the 
governor of the San Felipe Pueblo, explained, “water is the blood of our 
tribes.”
88
 The long history of conflict between tribal communities and 
the states has caused tribes to distrust the states’ ability to protect tribal 
interests.
89
 Tensions often escalate when natural resources such as water 
are involved, where both the tribe and the state want access to the 
disputed water resource.
90
 Senator Edward Kennedy noted that “Indian 
water rights—no matter how critical to a tribe’s future, no matter how 
well inventoried, no matter how brilliantly defended by government 
attorneys, cannot receive full protection in State court forums.”
91
 Tribes 
thus prefer to maintain water rights proceedings in federal court 
                                                      
83. See San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. at 549; Thorson, Dividing Western Waters II, supra 
note 9, at 335; COHEN, supra note 25, § 19.05[1], at 1207.  
84. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. at 566 n.17; COHEN supra note 25, § 19.05[1], at 1207. 
85. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. at 563–64; Thorson, Dividing Western Waters II, supra 
note 9, at 336. 
86. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. at 571. Additionally, federal courts have not actually been 
divested of jurisdiction to determine reserved water rights and courts can in fact refuse to abstain in 
favor of state court jurisdiction. For example, the Ninth Circuit upheld a district court’s right to do 
so in United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1404–07 (9th Cir. 1983). COHEN, supra note 25, 
§ 19.05[1], at 1208. 
87. Feldman, supra note 19, at 434. 
88. Id. at 433 (quoting Frank Tenorio, Epigraph to AM. INDIAN LAWYER TRAINING PROGRAM, 
INC., INDIAN WATER POLICY IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT: PERSPECTIVES ON INDIAN WATER 
RIGHTS, at 2 (Patricia Zell ed., 1982)). 
89. See Feldman, supra note 19, at 435–53. 
90. Id. at 445 (“The primary reason for states’ potential animosity toward Indians seeking water is 
that water is a valuable and scarce resource, especially in the thirsty American West.”). 
91. Id. at 449 (quoting Indian Water Rights: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Practice 
and Procedure of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1976)). 
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whenever possible.
92
 This was made substantially more difficult 
following the passage of the McCarran Amendment.
93
 With firm 
jurisdiction over federal water rights, including tribal rights, states began 
to quantify these rights actively through modern general stream 
adjudications.
94
 
B. Adjudications Under the McCarran Amendment Must Be 
Comprehensive and Include All of the Rights Asserted in the Water 
Source 
Determining what qualifies as a general stream adjudication is one of 
the most contentious issues resulting from the McCarran Amendment.
95
 
The McCarran Amendment itself mentions only adjudications of “a river 
system or other source,”
96
 leaving little guidance for states to determine 
exactly what waters this includes.
97
 The United States Supreme Court 
clarified this somewhat in 1963 by establishing a comprehensiveness 
requirement for general stream adjudications in Dugan v. Rank.
98
 This 
comprehensiveness requirement means that the adjudication must be 
inclusive of all of the rights of owners on a stream.
99
 The suit in Dugan 
was a private suit to determine water rights between certain individuals 
and the United States.
100
 Because it was a private suit, the action was not 
                                                      
92. Feldman, supra note 19, at 434. 
93. Id. at 442 (“Many observers, including some on the [Supreme] Court, have viewed with 
skepticism this application of the McCarran Amendment’s waiver of sovereign immunity to Indian 
water rights and the resulting adjudication of Indian water claims in state courts. Not surprisingly, 
the loudest voices of opposition have come from the Indian community.”). 
94. Thorson, Dividing Western Waters II, supra note 9, at 337. The large stream adjudications 
seen in Western states today took off in the 1970s as Wyoming, Arizona, Colorado, Montana, New 
Mexico, Washington, and Idaho all undertook “massive” water rights adjudications. Id. at 304. 
There are several reasons why states began to undertake these huge endeavors, including (but not 
limited to) a fear of large unadjudicated federal reserved water rights, a desire to restore state 
authority over water, a need to quantify and confirm existing rights, and the importance of 
developing a centralized system of monitoring water use. Id. at 305–06. 
95. Thorson, Dividing Western Waters I, supra note 34, at 458–59. 
96. 43 U.S.C. § 666(a) (2006).  
97. Thorson, Dividing Western Waters II, supra note 9, at 364 (“Water rights can be included or 
not included in an adjudication based on source, geographic location, priority date, legal basis, or 
type of water use, and it is unclear what exclusions are tolerable under the McCarran 
Amendment.”); Pacheco, supra note 12, at 646. 
98. Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 610, 626 (1963) (denying the ability of riparian and other 
overlying landowners to join the United States in a private suit to enjoin the Bureau of Reclamation 
from diverting water at the Friant Dam on the San Joaquin River in California). 
99. Anderson, supra note 4, at 421. 
100. Dugan, 372 U.S. at 618. 
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a general adjudication of “all of the rights of various owners on a given 
stream” and was therefore not comprehensive enough for the McCarran 
Amendment to apply.
101
 By requiring that the suit include all claimants 
to water rights on the river and establish priority of water rights between 
all users, the Court established the McCarran Amendment’s 
comprehensiveness requirement.
102
 
The U.S. Supreme Court again addressed comprehensiveness under 
the McCarran Amendment in United States v. District Court in and for 
the County of Eagle.
103
 In that case, the United States opposed an order 
to file a claim to rights in the Eagle River, a tributary of the Colorado 
River.
104
 The United States argued that Colorado’s adjudication was not 
for a “river system” as called for under the McCarran Amendment 
because it did not include the entire Colorado River.
105
 The Court 
deemed this contention to be “almost frivolous” and held that the state 
need only adjudicate a river system within its own jurisdiction.
106
 
Scholars typically divide comprehensiveness inquiries into three 
categories: use comprehensiveness, temporal comprehensiveness, and 
hydrologic comprehensiveness.
107
 Use comprehensiveness focuses on 
how the water is used and seeks to include all uses in an adjudication.
108
 
Such uses include domestic, stock watering, or agricultural uses.
109
 
Temporal comprehensiveness concerns what priority dates are included 
                                                      
101. Id. at 618–19 (quoting S. REP. NO. 755, at 9 (1951)). The Court also ruled that a suit could 
not be brought against the Bureau of Reclamation officials because the relief sought in the suit (an 
injunction and government funding of ten additional dams) would operate against the United States 
and therefore violate sovereign immunity. Id. at 621. Respondents were forced to pursue another 
avenue for relief by asserting that the Bureau’s action constituted a taking. Id. at 626. 
102. Pacheco, supra note 12, at 643. 
103. 401 U.S. 520 (1971). 
104. Id. at 521–22. 
105. Id. at 523. 
106. Id. Eagle County also held that the adjudication of rights under the McCarran Amendment 
would include appropriative rights, riparian rights, and reserved rights. Id. at 524. In Eagle County’s 
companion case, United States v. District Court for Water Division No. 5, 401 U.S. 527 (1971), the 
U.S. Supreme Court stated that the words “general adjudication” were used in Dugan v. Rank to 
demonstrate that Congress intended for the McCarran Amendment only to reach adjudications 
where all users in a water system were joined. Id. at 529. The Amendment was not intended to serve 
as a means for individual claims to be brought against the United States. Id. The Colorado 
adjudication process in Water Division No. 5, in which a water referee would sit and hear new water 
rights applications on a monthly basis, was held to be comprehensive because it reached all claims 
in the totality. Id. 
107. Thorson, Dividing Western Waters II, supra note 9, at 363–68. 
108. Id. at 366–67. 
109. Id. 
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in an adjudication.
110
 A temporal comprehensiveness requirement would 
suggest that all priority dates should be adjudicated together.
111
 Finally, 
hydrologic comprehensiveness focuses on the link between surface and 
groundwater and would require a general stream adjudication to include 
all hydrologically connected water sources.
112
 
III. APPLICATION OF HYDROLOGIC COMPREHENSIVENESS 
CREATES A LEGAL LINK BETWEEN SURFACE AND 
GROUNDWATER 
Because the McCarran Amendment is ambiguous, it is difficult for 
states to decide whether groundwater must be included in general stream 
adjudications.
113
 Hydrologic comprehensiveness focuses on the source 
of water that must be included in an adjudication of federal rights under 
the McCarran Amendment.
114
 Scientists have recognized the hydrologic 
link between surface and groundwater.
115
 So has the United States 
Supreme Court.
116
 
Water continuously moves through the hydrologic cycle, and it is 
difficult to distinguish between surface and groundwater.
117
 In fact, “[a]ll 
groundwater in motion . . . ultimately will supply some stream. Hence, 
arguments that all groundwater is tributary to a stream are scientifically 
sound.”
118
 Despite the scientific recognition of the hydrologic link 
                                                      
110. Id. at 368. For example, Oregon adjudicates only pre-1909 water rights, asserting that all 
subsequent rights have been adequately addressed through administrative procedures. See United 
States v. Oregon, 44 F.3d 758, 767–68 (9th Cir. 1994). 
111. Thorson, Dividing Western Waters II, supra note 9, at 367–68. 
112. Id. at 364. This Comment addresses only hydrologic comprehensiveness, asserting that it is 
the most essential to having productive stream adjudications due to the impact that groundwater 
withdrawal can have on surface water rights regardless of type of use or temporal proximity. See 
generally 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 1, § 18.02 (describing the science of 
groundwater and its relationship to surface water). 
113. Thorson, Dividing Western Waters II, supra note 9, at 365. Hydrological comprehensiveness 
may also look at how much of a river and how many tributaries should be included in an 
adjudication. This Comment, however, focuses on the groundwater and surface water aspects of 
hydrological comprehensiveness. 
114. Thorson, Dividing Western Waters II, supra note 9, at 364. 
115. 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 1, § 18.02 (quoting Mary P. Anderson, 
Hydrogeologic Framework for Groundwater Protection, in PLANNING FOR GROUNDWATER 
PROTECTION 1, 1–2 (G. William Page ed., 1987)). 
116. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 142–43 (1976). 
117. 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 1, § 18.02 (quoting Mary P. Anderson, 
Hydrogeologic Framework for Groundwater Protection, in PLANNING FOR GROUNDWATER 
PROTECTION 1, 1–2 (G. William Page ed., 1987)). 
118. Id. 
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between surface and groundwater, the law has been slow to 
acknowledge this connection.
119
 Since the first half of the twentieth 
century, prominent water law scholars such as Samuel Wiel have pushed 
states to recognize the unavoidable connection between surface and 
groundwater and to unify the laws regulating the two.
120
 Similarly, noted 
natural resources scholar Charles Wilkinson has observed that the 
traditional legal approach to surface and groundwater fails to 
acknowledge the “hydrologic reality” of their connection.
121
 
One way of responding to this “hydrologic reality” is to pursue an 
integrated approach to surface and groundwater.
122
 Because so much 
more information regarding hydrology is now available, courts are able 
to identify specific groundwater rights and the way in which 
groundwater pumping affects surface water.
123
 States adjudicating 
federal water rights now have the capability to map both the location of 
groundwater and its interaction with surface water.
124
 Some western 
states, such as Colorado, Idaho, Nevada, and Utah, adjudicate both 
surface and groundwater sources together.
125
 Even the United States 
Supreme Court has recognized the hydraulic link between surface and 
groundwater.
126
 In Cappaert v. United States, the Court allowed 
protection of federal water rights from nearby groundwater withdrawals 
because “groundwater and surface water are physically interrelated as 
integral parts of the hydrologic cycle.”
127
 
                                                      
119. Id. 
120. Samuel C. Wiel, Need of Unified Law for Surface and Underground Water, 2 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 358, 362 (1929); 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 1, § 18.03. 
121. Charles F. Wilkinson, Western Water Law in Transition, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 317, 321–22 
(1985) (“[W]e have learned that ground water is usually hydrologically related to surface water, so 
that the traditional system of managing surface water and ground water separately fails to reflect the 
hydrologic reality: conjunctive management of underground and surface resources is required when 
the two connect up.”). 
122. 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 1, § 18.03 (citing Earl Finbar Murphy, Some 
Legal Solutions for Contemporary Problems Concerning Groundwater and Aquifers, 4 J. MIN. L. & 
POL’Y 49 (1988)). 
123. Id. (“[G]roundwater management or litigation does not require, in many cases, massive 
research for new knowledge and it provides a method for evaluation that can direct: the use of 
scarce resources; the way surface land is used; and the impact of demand of many kinds upon the 
groundwater resource.”). 
124. See id. § 18.03(a). 
125. Thorson, Dividing Western Waters II, supra note 9, at 365 (citing COLO. REV. STAT. 
§ 37-82-101 (2005); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 42-103 (2005); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 533.030 
(LexisNexis 2005); UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-4-3 (2005)). 
126. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 142–43 (1976). 
127. Id. (quoting C. CORKER, GROUNDWATER LAW, MANAGEMENT, AND ADMINISTRATION, 
NAT’L WATER COMM’N LEGAL STUDY NO. 6, xxiv (1971)). 
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Still, other states such as New Mexico maintain separate procedures 
for adjudicating groundwater and surface water claims.
128
 Likewise, in 
Arizona and Texas, the “hydrologic myth that groundwater is somehow 
separate from surface water prevails.”
129
 Washington State uses the same 
statutory procedure to adjudicate surface and groundwater, but has yet to 
include groundwater in a surface water general stream adjudication.
130
 
IV. IN UNITED STATES V. OREGON, THE NINTH CIRCUIT HELD 
THAT THE MCCARRAN AMENDMENT DOES NOT 
REQUIRE HYDROLOGIC COMPREHENSIVENESS 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals is the only federal appellate court 
to address a claim of hydrologic comprehensiveness in detail. In 1990, 
the State of Oregon began an adjudication of the Klamath River Basin 
and attempted to include the United States as a defendant on behalf of 
several federal agencies and as a trustee for the Klamath Tribe.
131
 The 
United States responded by filing suit in federal court seeking a 
declaratory judgment that the United States had not waived its sovereign 
immunity.
132
 The United States claimed that its sovereign immunity had 
not been waived because Oregon’s adjudication was not comprehensive 
for purposes of the McCarran Amendment.
133
 
The United States’ primary comprehensiveness argument was that the 
adjudication failed to include groundwater claims in the Klamath 
Basin.
134
 The United States stressed that the McCarran Amendment’s 
overarching purpose was to avoid piecemeal litigation.
135
 In supporting 
                                                      
128. Thorson, Dividing Western Waters II, supra note 9, at 365 (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-
5A-1 (2005)). 
129. Id. (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-141(A) (2005); TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.312 
(West 2005)). 
130. See infra Part V. 
131. United States v. Oregon, 44 F.3d 758, 762 (9th Cir. 1994). This is Oregon’s second 
adjudication of the Klamath River Basin. In 1975, Oregon notified the United States and the 
Klamath Tribe of its intent to adjudicate, and the United States instituted a federal suit seeking a 
declaration of federal water rights in the basin, subsequently halting the adjudication. The federal 
suit went to the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1983), where the 
court held that while the United States and the Klamath Tribe did have water rights, quantification 
was left to the state in a general stream adjudication. Oregon renewed its attempt to adjudicate the 
Klamath River Basin in 1990. Oregon, 44 F.3d at 762. 
132. Oregon, 44 F.3d at 762. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. at 768.  
135. Brief for the United States in Reply as Appellant and in Response as Cross-Appellee at 30, 
United States v. Oregon, 44 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 1994) (Nos. 92-36983, 92-36985, 92-36987, 92-
37001), 1993 WL 13099176 [hereinafter United States Reply Brief]. 
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this argument, the United States pointed to cases holding that the 
McCarran Amendment requires adjudicating interrelated water rights in 
the same proceeding.
136
 The United States argued that the McCarran 
Amendment’s comprehensiveness requirement “makes no sense if an 
adjudication excludes adjudication of groundwater rights claims, the 
exercise of which could impair surface water rights.”
137
 The United 
States also emphasized that the U.S. Supreme Court has never ruled on 
the specific question of groundwater inclusion under the McCarran 
Amendment, and thus no prior precedent was entirely on point.
138
 
The Ninth Circuit, in an opinion by Judge William A. Norris, rejected 
these arguments.
139
 The court focused first on the language of the 
McCarran Amendment, which states that it applies to “water of a river 
system or other source.”
140
 The court interpreted “or” to mean that a 
state had a choice between adjudicating surface water or adjudicating 
groundwater,
141
 and held that the state did not have to do both.
142
 While 
the court acknowledged that one of the main purposes of the McCarran 
Amendment was to avoid piecemeal litigation, it relied heavily on the 
                                                      
136. Id. at 30–31 (citing, among others, Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 
424 U.S 800, 810–11 (1976) (cannot exclude Indian water rights); United States v. Dist. Court in 
and for the Cnty. of Eagle Colo., 401 U.S. 520, 524 (1971) (cannot exclude federal reserved rights); 
Metro. Water Dist. of S. Cal. v. United States, 830 F.2d 139, 144 (9th Cir. 1987) (need all claimants 
on the stream); S. Delta Water Agency v. Dep’t of the Interior, 767 F.2d 531, 542 (9th Cir. 1985) 
(need all conflicting claims for joinder of U.S.); In re Snake River Basin Water Sys., 764 P.2d 78, 
86 (Ida. 1988) (joinder of U.S. required joinder of two hydrologically related sub-basins)). 
137. United States Reply Brief, supra note 135, at 29–30 n.14. The United States specifically 
noted that an adjudication without groundwater: “(1) would not include all users of the river 
system’s water, (2) would not include all rights in the river system’s water, and (3) would not 
include all water sources of the river system.” Brief for the United States of America as Appellant at 
43, United States v. Oregon, 44 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 1994) (Nos. 92-36983, 92-36985, 92-36987, 92-
37001), 1993 WL 13011224. 
138. United States Reply Brief, supra note 135, at 28. In the Senate Report on the McCarran 
Amendment, a reference is made to the adjudication in Pacific Live Stock Co. v. Lewis, 241 U.S. 
440 (1916), as an example of a valid adjudication under the Amendment. Because that particular 
adjudication did not include groundwater, Oregon argued that groundwater inclusion was not 
necessary. Appellees’/Cross-Appellants’ Brief at 17–18, United States v. Oregon, 44 F.3d 758 (9th 
Cir. 1994) (Nos. 92-36983, 92-36985, 92-36987, 92-37001), 1993 WL 13011225. The United States 
pointed out that groundwater was not an issue in that particular adjudication and that the quote used 
in the Senate Report (that an adjudication “is intended to be universal and to result in a complete 
ascertainment of all existing rights”) does not make sense if groundwater claims that would impact 
surface water are not included. United States Reply Brief, supra note 135, at 28–29 n.14 (citing S. 
REP. NO. 755, at 5 (1951)). 
139. Oregon, 44 F.3d at 758. 
140. Id. at 768 (quotation marks omitted) (citing 43 U.S.C. § 666(a) (2006)). 
141. Id. 
142. Id. at 768. 
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United States Supreme Court’s decision in Eagle County.
143
 Eagle 
County stands for the proposition that it is not necessary to include every 
single hydrologically connected water source in a general stream 
adjudication, particularly where those water sources extend beyond the 
state’s boundaries.
144
 The court used Eagle County to support its holding 
that hydrologic comprehensiveness was unnecessary and that 
groundwater rights need not be included.
145
 
The Ninth Circuit then analyzed how the law has responded to the 
science of hydrologically related water sources. The court stated that the 
law traditionally treated surface and groundwater differently by applying 
different regulatory schemes to the two types of water.
146
 It also noted 
that different states apply riparian, absolute dominion, American 
reasonable use, and correlative rights doctrines to groundwater, none of 
which establish temporal priority by use.
147
 In determining that some 
states did not apply prior appropriation to groundwater, thereby not 
assessing rights by temporal proximity, the court concluded that the 
adjudication procedure’s major function—determining the priority of 
water rights—was absent.
148
 The court then looked to which 
groundwater regimes states used in 1952, the year the McCarran 
Amendment took effect. Because not all states used prior appropriation 
for groundwater in 1952, the court found that the law was not yet ready 
to embrace a hydrologic continuity approach to stream adjudications.
149
 
                                                      
143. Id. at 768–70. 
144. United States v. Dist. Court in and for the Cnty. of Eagle Colo., 401 U.S. 520, 523 (1971); 
see supra notes 103–106 and accompanying text. 
145. Oregon, 44 F.3d at 769 (stating that the discussion of an adjudication touching many states 
in Eagle County “suggests that, contrary to the United States’ assertions, the comprehensiveness 
requirement does not mandate that every hydrologically-related water source be included in the 
adjudication”). 
146. Id. (“One of the ways in which the law has traditionally ignored the exhortation of the 
scientists is by treating ground and surface water as distinct subjects, often applying separate law to 
each. While rights to surface water in the Western states have generally been allocated under the 
appropriation doctrine, the rights to groundwater were traditionally riparian.”). 
147. Id. at 769; see also SAX, supra note 32, at 415–17 (describing the five primary means by 
which American jurisdictions quantify groundwater rights: (1) capture, which operates on a “first 
come, first serve” basis; (2) American reasonable use, in which the water must be put to reasonable 
use on the overlying tract with no limit to amount provided use is reasonable; (3) correlative rights, 
which requires equal sharing of the water between overlying landowners; (4) the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts reasonable use, which lays out specific rules of allocation; and (5) prior 
appropriation, which applies a “first in time, first in right” framework to water rights). 
148. Oregon, 44 F.3d at 769. 
149. Id. at 769–70 & n.9 (noting that in 1952 prior appropriation for groundwater was used in 
Idaho, Kansas, Nevada, Oklahoma, and Utah, while riparian doctrines applied in Arizona, 
California, Colorado, Montana, Nebraska, South Dakota, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming). The 
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The court did acknowledge that since 1952 some states have moved 
toward better coordination between quantifying surface and groundwater 
rights.
150
 The court concluded, however, that the “recognition is too 
recent and too incomplete” to require disposition of groundwater rights 
in general stream adjudications under the McCarran Amendment.
151
 The 
court thus held that hydrologic comprehensiveness was not required to 
waive federal sovereign immunity under the McCarran Amendment.
152
 
After the Ninth Circuit’s decision, the Klamath Tribe petitioned the 
United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.
153
 The Office of the 
United States Solicitor General submitted a brief to the Court in 
opposition to the cert petition.
154
 While the Solicitor General ultimately 
concluded that the time was not right for the Court to review the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision, the Solicitor General expressed the opinion that the 
Ninth Circuit was actually in error. The Solicitor General noted that the 
surface and groundwater in the Klamath Basin were hydrologically 
connected and that the purpose of the McCarran Amendment was to 
require comprehensive adjudications of entire river systems.
155
 The 
Solicitor General went on to state that an adjudication excluding 
hydrologically connected groundwater “defeats ‘Congress’ purposes’ by 
encouraging future piecemeal adjudication.”
156
 However, despite the 
assertion that the Ninth Circuit had incorrectly ruled on the groundwater 
issue in United States v. Oregon, the Solicitor General recommended 
that the U.S. Supreme Court not grant the cert petition because the issue 
had not received significant consideration in other courts of appeals or 
the highest courts of the various states.
157
 
                                                      
court was incorrect here regarding its characterization of Washington water law. Washington has 
applied a prior appropriation system to groundwater since 1945. See Act of Mar. 19, 1945, ch. 263, 
1944–45 Wash. Sess. Laws 826 (current version at WASH. REV. CODE ch. 90.44 (2010)); PHARRIS, 
supra note 62, at V:9. 
150. Oregon, 44 F.3d at 769 (“[A]n increased recognition of the relationship between ground and 
surface water has led some states to attempt better coordination between the allocation of surface 
and groundwater rights . . . .”). 
151. Id. at 770. 
152. Id. 
153. United States v. Oregon, 516 U.S. 943 (1995) (denying certiorari). 
154. Brief for the United States in Opposition at 10, Klamath Tribe v. Oregon, 516 U.S. 943 
(1995) (No. 95-151), 1995 WL 17047729. 
155. Id. at 10–11. 
156. Id. at 11. 
157. Id. The Solicitor General also noted the existence of other, “albeit less effective,” remedies 
available to the Klamath Tribe, such as adjudicating groundwater in federal court. Id. 11–12. 
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V. WASHINGTON RECOGNIZES HYDRAULIC CONTINUITY, 
BUT HAS NOT APPLIED IT IN GENERAL STREAM 
ADJUDICATIONS 
Since 1944, Washington has applied the prior appropriation system to 
both surface and groundwater.
158
 The Washington State Legislature and 
the Washington State Supreme Court have both acknowledged the 
science of hydraulic continuity between surface and groundwater and the 
impact that groundwater withdrawal can have on surface waters.
159
 
Washington has accepted the science of hydraulic continuity in resolving 
state water rights disputes.
160
 However, Washington’s general stream 
adjudication process permits, but does not require, the inclusion of both 
surface and groundwater users.
161
 Even so, conflicts involving federal 
reserved water rights could draw from state case law to incorporate the 
principle of hydraulic continuity into general stream adjudications. 
A. Washington Applies the Prior Appropriation System to Both 
Surface and Groundwater and Accepts the Science of Hydraulic 
Continuity 
Washington State has established the prior appropriation system for 
both surface and groundwater.
162
 To regulate surface water, the state 
legislature enacted the Water Code of 1917.
163
 The Code established the 
prior appropriation system for surface water and created a permit system 
to govern surface water use.
164
 To regulate groundwater, the legislature 
                                                      
158. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 90.03 (2010) (Surface Water Code); WASH. REV. CODE ch. 90.44 
(2010) (Groundwater Code); Tom McDonald, Washington, in 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 
§ I(A)(4),(6) (Robert E. Beck & Amy L. Kelly eds., 3d ed. LexisNexis/Matthew Bender 2009). 
Prior appropriation is based on a “first in time, first in right” approach to water rights. WASH. REV. 
CODE § 90.03.010 (2010). 
159. Postema v. Pollution Control Hearings Bd., 142 Wash. 2d 68, 95, 11 P.3d 726, 742 (2000); 
Rettkowski v. Dep’t of Ecology, 122 Wash. 2d 219, 226 n.1, 858 P.2d 232, 236 n.1 (1993); WASH. 
REV. CODE § 90.44.030 (2010). 
160. See, e.g. Postema, at 95, 11 P.3d at 742. 
161. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 90.44.220 (2010) (allowing the Department of Ecology to 
have a general stream adjudication include “either rights to the use of surface water or to the use of 
groundwater, or both”). 
162. States have the power to regulate waters within their boundaries. See supra note 71 and 
accompanying text. 
163. Act of Mar. 14, 1917, ch. 117, 1917 Wash. Sess. Laws 447 (codified as amended at WASH. 
REV. CODE ch. 90.03 (2010)).  
164. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03.010 (2010) (“[A]s between appropriations, the first in time shall 
be the first in right.”). The Washington State Supreme Court gave riparian owners fifteen years 
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adopted the Groundwater Code in 1945.
165
 The Groundwater Code 
extended the prior appropriation system to groundwater and made the 
permit system the sole method for obtaining groundwater rights.
166
 
Washington’s statutory regime recognizes hydraulic continuity 
between surface and groundwater. In enacting the Groundwater Code, 
the Washington State Legislature acknowledged the potential for conflict 
between surface and groundwater users and stressed the priority of 
surface water rights.
167
 The legislature also directed the Washington 
State Department of Ecology, the state agency responsible for 
determining water rights, to give “[f]ull recognition . . . in the 
administration of water allocation and use programs to the natural 
interrelationships of surface and groundwaters.”
168
 The Washington 
State Supreme Court recognized this legislative intent in Rettkowski v. 
Department of Ecology,
169
 holding that groundwater rights should “be 
considered a part of the overall water appropriation scheme, subject to 
the paramount rule of ‘first in time, first in right.’”
170
 
In addition to Rettkowski, two other Washington cases have positively 
addressed the hydraulic continuity between surface and groundwaters. 
                                                      
(until 1932) to develop their riparian water rights and put them to beneficial use before they became 
subject to abandonment or forfeiture. In re Deadman Creek, 103 Wash. 2d 686, 695, 694 P.2d 1071, 
1076 (1985). 
165. Act of Mar. 19, 1945, 1944–45 Wash. Sess. Laws 826 (current version at WASH. REV. CODE 
ch. 90.44 (2010)). WASH. REV. CODE § 90.44.035 (2010) defines groundwaters:  
[A]ll waters that exist beneath the land surface or beneath the bed of any stream, lake or 
reservoir, or other body of surface water within the boundaries of this state, whatever may be 
the geological formation or structure in which such water stands or flows, percolates or 
otherwise moves. There is a recognized distinction between natural groundwater and 
artificially stored groundwater. 
166. PHARRIS, supra note 62, at V:9; McDonald, supra note 158, § I(A)(6). WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 90.44.060 (2010) specifically references §§ 90.03.250–.340 of the surface code to describe the 
permitting system. However, the Groundwater Code contains an exemption from the permitting 
process for stockwater, domestic uses on less than one-half acre of land, and industrial or domestic 
uses of less than 5,000 gallons per day. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.44.050 (2010); McDonald, supra 
note 158, § I(A)(6). For more information on litigation surrounding the stockwater exemption, see 
State Water Use Laws: The Groundwater Permit Exemption RCW 90.44.050, WASH. DEP’T OF 
ECOLOGY, http://www.ecy.wa.gov/programs/wr/comp_enforce/gwpe.html (last visited Jan. 26, 
2011). 
167. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.44.030 (2010) (“[T]o the extent that any underground water is part 
of or tributary to the source of any surface stream or lake, or that the withdrawal of groundwater 
may affect the flow of any spring, water course, lake, or other body of surface water, the right of an 
appropriator and owner of surface water shall be superior to any subsequent right hereby authorized 
to be acquired in or to groundwater.”). 
168. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.54.020(9) (2010). 
169. Rettkowski v. Dep’t of Ecology, 122 Wash. 2d 219, 226 n.1, 858 P.2d 232, 236 n.1 (1993). 
170. Id.; PHARRIS, supra note 62, at V:29. 
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First, in Hubbard v. State,
171
 the Washington Court of Appeals upheld 
the Department of Ecology’s decision to place conditions on 
groundwater permits where groundwater use would result in the 
Okanogan River being below minimum instream flows.
172
 The court 
focused on a finding of “significant hydraulic continuity” between the 
Wagonroad Coulee aquifer and the Okanogan River.
173
 The court stated 
that where significant hydraulic continuity exists, “the groundwater 
rights permit must be subject to the same conditions, i.e., restrictions on 
withdrawal, as the affected surface water.”
174
 
The second case to recognize hydraulic continuity between surface 
and groundwater was Postema v. Pollution Control Hearings Board.
175
 
In Postema, the Washington State Supreme Court held that the state 
must deny a groundwater permit when there is hydraulic continuity and 
when groundwater withdrawal would negatively impact surface water 
rights.
176
 Furthermore, the court held that when a basin is closed to 
appropriations, a groundwater permit in hydraulic continuity with the 
basin must be denied if there is evidence that the withdrawal will affect 
flow or surface water levels.
177
 These two cases demonstrate that 
Washington courts recognize the necessity of addressing hydraulic 
continuity when permitting both surface and groundwater uses. 
                                                      
171. 86 Wash. App. 119, 936 P.2d 27 (1997) 
172. Id. at 121, 936 P.2d at 28. 
173. Id. at 125, 936 P.2d at 29 (quoting WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 173-549-060 (2009)). 
174. Id. The court in Hubbard relied upon the Washington Administrative Code (WAC) 
governing water rights for that particular region of Washington. This code provision applied the 
same requirements to hydraulically linked surface and groundwater. Id. at 126, 936 P.2d at 30 
(citing WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 173-549-060 (2009)). Washington is divided into Water Resource 
Inventory Areas (WRIA), with each WRIA adopting resource protection plans for the area. Not all 
WRIAs will have the same standards, meaning that different WAC provisions apply to the various 
areas. Jeffrey S. Myers, Water Rights Responsibilities for Counties in the Wake of 1997 AGO No. 6, 
WAPA Summer Training Program: Civil Track (June 24–26, 1998), http://www.mrsc.org/ 
Subjects/Environment/water/WAPAMY.aspx. 
175. 142 Wash. 2d 68, 11 P.3d 726 (2000). 
176. Id. at 95, 11 P.3d at 742. The court looked only to “hydraulic continuity” instead of 
“significant hydraulic continuity” because the WRIA at issue in Postema did not fall under the same 
WAC as in Hubbard. Id. at 86, 11 P.3d at 738.  
177. Id. at 95, 11 P.3d at 742. 
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B. Washington’s Statutory General Stream Adjudication Process 
Does Not Require Inclusion of Both Surface and Groundwater 
In Washington, the general stream adjudication process is the only 
way to give legal certainty to water rights.
178
 General stream 
adjudications are governed by the Surface Water Code for surface 
water
179
 and the Groundwater Code for groundwater.
180
 The Washington 
State Department of Ecology begins the adjudication process by filing 
suit in superior court.
181
 Water rights holders in the adjudicated area are 
then notified of the suit and the holders are required to file a claim in 
order to become a defendant.
182
 Each claimant—the defendant in an 
adjudication—must file evidence with the court to support the water 
right they claim.
183
 The Department of Ecology then holds an 
evidentiary hearing regarding the water right.
184
 The adjudication statute 
instructs the Department of Ecology and the claimants to confer together 
when appropriate and also encourages settlement agreements at the 
hearing stage.
185
 
After the evidentiary hearing, the Department of Ecology issues a 
report of findings and recommendations to the superior court.
186
 Based 
on the evidence and findings, the Department of Ecology either files a 
motion for a partial decree in favor of the claims it has deemed 
substantiated, or a motion seeking in-court determinations of contested 
claims.
187
 Should a claimant disagree with the Department of Ecology, 
                                                      
178. Water Right General Adjudications, STATE OF WASH. DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, 
http://www.ecy.wa.gov/programs/WR/rights/adjhome.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2011). 
179. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 90.03.110–90.03.240 (2010). There have been eighty-two stream 
adjudications in Washington since the Water Code of 1917 was enacted. Water Right General 
Adjudications, STATE OF WASH. DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, http://www.ecy.wa.gov/programs/WR/ 
rights/adjhome.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2011). The longest running adjudication is the Yakima 
River Basin Surface Water Adjudication (also known as the Acquavella adjudication), which began 
in 1977 and is now in its final stages. Barbara Markham, Asst. Att’y Gen., Ecology Div., Water 
Section, Wash. State Office of the Att’y Gen., Presentation at the 22nd Annual University of 
Washington Indian Law Symposium (Sept. 11, 2009). 
180. See WASH. REV. CODE § 90.44.220 (2010) (applying the provisions of WASH. REV. CODE 
§§ 90.03.110–.240 (2010) to groundwater adjudications); see also McDonald, supra note 158, 
§ I(A)(5). 
181. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03.110(1) (2010). 
182. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03.120 (2010). 
183. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03.635 (2010). 
184. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 90.03.640(1), .160(2) (2010). 
185. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03.640(2)(b) (2010). 
186. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03.640(3) (2010). 
187. Id. 
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that claimant may file an exception to the report.
188
 Once all of the 
exceptions are decided, the superior court issues a final decree and the 
Department of Ecology provides a Certificate of Adjudicated Water 
Right for each affirmed right.
189
 This certificate represents a legally valid 
right and will include the priority date, purpose of use, quantity, point of 
diversion, place of use, and any limitations on the right.
190
 
The legislature amended Washington’s general stream adjudication 
statutes in July 2009.
191
 The changes require the Department of Ecology 
to review all claims filed and then move to either accept the claims or 
have them be determined by a court.
192
 The new legislation also 
encourages the Department of Ecology and claimants to “work closely 
together” to resolve claims outside of court.
193
 The 2009 amendments do 
not mandate that groundwater be included in a surface water 
adjudication where federal reserved water rights are at issue. The 
Department of Ecology, however, does have the ability to define the 
scope of an adjudication through both the Surface Water
194
 and 
Groundwater Code, with the Groundwater Code providing that the 
adjudication may include “either rights to the use of surface water or to 
the use of groundwater, or both.”
195
 Thus, while the Department of 
Ecology can include both surface and groundwater within the same 
adjudication, it is not required to do so.
196
 The statute, except for fee 
exemptions, is silent on situations involving federal reserved water 
rights.
197
 
                                                      
188. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03.160(1) (2010). 
189. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03.240 (2010). 
190. Id. 
191. Act of May 5, 2009, ch. 332, 2009 Wash. Sess. Laws 1663 (current version at WASH REV. 
CODE ch. 90.03). 
192. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03.640(3) (2010); Barbara Markham, supra note 179. 
193. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 90.03.640(2)(b), 90.03.645 (2010); Barbara Markham, supra note 
179. 
194. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03.110(1) (2010) (“Upon the filing of a petition with the department 
by a planning unit or by one or more persons claiming the right to divert any waters within the state 
or when, after investigation, in the judgment of the department, the public interest will be served by 
a determination of the rights thereto, the department shall prepare a statement of the facts, together 
with a plan or map of the locality under investigation, and file such statement and plan or map in the 
superior court of the county in which said water is situated.”). 
195. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.44.220 (2010). 
196. Id. 
197. The United States government and Indian tribes are exempt from paying filing and other 
fees in adjudications under the McCarran Amendment because the Amendment specifically states 
that “no judgment for costs shall be entered against the United States.” 43 U.S.C. § 666(a) (2006). 
In Washington, this is codified at WASH. REV. CODE §§ 90.03.180, .200 (2010). 
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C. Washington’s Yakima River Basin Adjudication Did Not Include 
Groundwater 
The longest running general stream adjudication in Washington State 
is the Acquavella surface water adjudication in the Yakima River 
Basin.
198
 In Acquavella, the Yakima County Superior Court rejected the 
assertion that joinder of groundwater users is required for a waiver of 
federal sovereign immunity under the McCarran Amendment.
199
 In 
August of 1984, ten years before the Ninth Circuit’s decision in United 
States v. Oregon, the United States filed a motion in the Acquavella 
adjudication to join groundwater users as necessary parties or dismiss 
the United States.
200
 The superior court, in a decision by Judge Walter A. 
Stauffacher, began its opinion by discussing groundwater use in the 
Yakima River Basin.
201
 The court noted that there were three principal 
aquifers in the region and approximately 19,000 known claimants to 
groundwater rights.
202
 The court also acknowledged, to the agreement of 
all parties, that groundwater in the area was “hydrologically connected 
to the Yakima River and its tributaries.”
203
 The court noted that 
groundwater pumping would diminish surface stream flow.
204
 
The court then discussed general stream adjudications, focusing on 
the McCarran Amendment’s text and what Congress knew in 1952 when 
the Amendment was passed.
205
 Because Congress had acknowledged the 
existence of groundwater in the Senate Report on the McCarran 
Amendment, the court asserted that the language “river system or other 
source” in the McCarran Amendment “clearly” distinguished between 
surface water and groundwater.
206
 The separation of “river system” and 
                                                      
198. The Acquavella adjudication began in October 1977 and continues through the present day. 
Memorandum Opinion re: Motion to Join Parties or Dismiss the United States at 1, Dep’t of 
Ecology v. Acquavella, No. 77-2-01484-5 (Wash. Super. Ct. Mar. 12, 1985). This opinion is not 
available in most legal databases. It is on file with Washington Law Review. For updates on the 
progress of the Acquavella adjudication see Water Right General Adjudications, STATE OF WASH. 
DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, http://www.ecy.wa.gov/programs/wr/rights/adjhome.html (last visited Jan. 30, 
2011). 
199. Memorandum Opinion re: Motion to Join Parties or Dismiss the United States at 1, Dep’t of 
Ecology v. Acquavella, No. 77-2-01484-5 (Wash. Super. Ct. Mar. 12, 1985). This opinion is not 
available in most legal databases. It is on file with Washington Law Review. 
200. Id. at 3. 
201. Id. at 3–5. 
202. Id. 
203. Id. at 4. 
204. Id. 
205. Id. at 9–10. 
206. Id. at 10. 
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“other source” with an “or” in the McCarran Amendment was held to 
allow for comprehensive adjudications of either surface water or 
groundwater.
207
 In addition, the court found that Congress implicitly 
accepted Washington’s adjudication process because it existed at the 
time Congress passed the Amendment.
208
 Finally, the court relied on the 
fact that it was not then “presently possible to” predict the impact 
groundwater pumping would have on surface water streamflow.
209
 The 
court maintained its jurisdiction over the United States through the 
McCarran Amendment and allowed the adjudication to proceed.
210
 
VI. WASHINGTON SHOULD INCLUDE GROUNDWATER IN 
GENERAL STREAM ADJUDICATIONS INVOLVING 
FEDERAL WATER RIGHTS 
Washington should require the inclusion of hydrologically connected 
surface and groundwater users when adjudicating federal reserved water 
rights. The Washington State Supreme Court should reject the Ninth 
Circuit’s reasoning in United States v. Oregon. The Washington State 
Supreme Court is not bound by Ninth Circuit precedent and can choose 
to interpret the McCarran Amendment to include groundwater.
211
 
Washington should also re-examine the Yakima County Superior 
Court’s outdated understanding of hydraulic continuity in the Acquavella 
adjudication. By doing so, the Washington State Supreme Court would 
re-affirm the connection between surface and groundwater and protect 
federal reserved water rights, including the important water rights of 
Indian tribes. Adjudicating surface and groundwater users together 
would also avoid piecemeal litigation, accomplishing the McCarran 
Amendment’s primary purpose. This is especially true as Washington 
faces ongoing water rights disputes across the state in the years ahead. 
                                                      
207. Id. 
208. Id. at 14. 
209. Id. at 17. 
210. Id. at 19. 
211. In re Detention of Turay, 139 Wash. 2d 379, 402, 986 P.2d 790, 802 (1999) (“[F]ederal case 
law interpreting a federal rule is not binding on [the Washington State Supreme Court] even where 
the rule is identical ‘this court is the final authority insofar as interpretations of this State’s rules is 
concerned.’” (quoting State v. Copeland, 130 Wash. 2d 244, 258–59, 922 P.2d 1304, 1314 (1996))). 
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A. The Washington State Supreme Court Should Reject the Ninth 
Circuit’s Flawed Reasoning in United States v. Oregon 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Oregon that 
groundwater was not necessary for a comprehensive adjudication under 
the McCarran Amendment was incorrect for two reasons. First, the 
Ninth Circuit failed to distinguish groundwater users from the out-of-
state water right holders at issue in Eagle County. This omission ignores 
the importance of hydrologic continuity, similar to the Yakima County 
Superior Court’s ruling in the Acquavella adjudication. Second, the 
Ninth Circuit incorrectly reasoned that water law treats surface and 
groundwater separately. This narrow conception of water law ignores 
important considerations for treating surface and groundwater together, 
including the consistent adjudication of tribal water rights. 
The Ninth Circuit placed too much precedential value upon the 
United States Supreme Court’s decision in Eagle County. In Eagle 
County, the United States argued that all connected water sources need 
to be adjudicated at the same time in order to join the federal 
government under the McCarran Amendment.
212
 The Court properly 
held that the McCarran Amendment’s comprehensiveness requirement 
did not require states to include all connected water sources that ran into 
other states.
213
 In its heavy reliance on Eagle County, the Ninth Circuit 
failed to properly distinguish in-state groundwater users from the out-of-
state water users at issue in Eagle County. In Eagle County, the U.S. 
Supreme Court said the government’s argument for state adjudication of 
out-of-state water rights was “almost frivolous.” 
214
 Arguing that 
hydrologically connected surface and groundwater be adjudicated at the 
same time is not “almost frivolous.” It is an argument based on sound 
science and a growing legal trend. The U.S. Supreme Court itself has 
acknowledged that “groundwater and surface water are physically 
interrelated as integral parts of the hydrologic cycle.”
215
 The unfounded 
claims rejected in Eagle County should not tarnish the important and 
legitimate connection between surface and groundwater. 
In Washington, the Yakima County Superior Court made a similar 
ruling to United States v. Oregon, holding in 1985 that a general stream 
                                                      
212. United States v. Dist. Court in and for the Cnty. of Eagle Colo., 401 U.S. 520, 523 (1971). 
213. Id.  
214. Id. 
215. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 142 (1976) (quoting C. CORKER, GROUNDWATER 
LAW, MANAGEMENT, AND ADMINISTRATION, NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION LEGAL STUDY NO. 
6, xxiv (1971)). 
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adjudication did not require groundwater.
216
 This decision should not be 
conclusive. First, the court recognized hydraulic continuity, a science 
that has been further developed and incorporated into the Washington 
legal system in cases such as Hubbard
217
 and Postema.
218
 Importantly, in 
Postema, the Washington State Supreme Court stated that “[The 
Department of] Ecology may use new information and scientific 
methodology as it becomes available and scientifically acceptable for 
determining hydraulic continuity and the effect of groundwater 
withdrawals on surface waters.”
219
 The inclusion of both surface and 
groundwater in future adjudications would be consistent with this 
important directive. 
In addition to its improper reading of Eagle County, the Ninth Circuit 
in United States v. Oregon incorrectly reasoned that state water law 
treats surface and groundwater separately. The court quoted a portion of 
Beck’s treatise Waters and Water Rights indicating that states have not 
adopted a legal regime for uniform treatment of surface and 
groundwater. 
220
 By relying on this narrow statement, the court failed to 
acknowledge states, such as Washington,
221
 that do recognize the science 
of hydrologic continuity and have integrated it into water rights 
adjudications. Simply because states have not adopted a uniform system 
for managing surface and groundwater together does not mean states 
should not adjudicate surface and groundwater together. There are 
circumstances in which the two must be considered together, such as 
when a state is attempting to quantify tribal water rights. 
Furthermore, the United States Solicitor General’s brief in opposition 
to the Klamath Tribe’s petition for writ of certiorari supports a finding 
that the Ninth Circuit was in error. The Solicitor General explicitly 
stated that the Ninth Circuit was wrong in ruling that the McCarran 
Amendment does not require the inclusion of hydrologically connected 
                                                      
216. See supra notes 198–210 and accompanying text (discussing the Acquavella litigation). 
217. Hubbard v. State, 86 Wash. App. 119, 122, 936 P.2d 27, 28 (1997). 
218. Postema v. Pollution Control Hearings Bd., 142 Wash. 2d 68, 93, 11 P.3d 726, 741 (2000). 
219. Id. at 93, 11 P.3d at 741. 
220. United States v. Oregon, 44 F.3d 758, 769 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[S]cientists have long delighted 
in pointing out to lawyers that all waters are interrelated in one continuous hydrologic cycle. As a 
result, it has become fashionable to argue that an effective legal regime should govern all forms and 
uses of water in a consistent and uniform manner. The law is otherwise.” (quoting 1 WATERS AND 
WATER RIGHTS, § 6.02) (Robert E. Beck & Amy L. Kelly eds., 3d ed. LexisNexis/Matthew Bender 
2009)). 
221. See supra Part V.A. 
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groundwater.
222
 The Solicitor General referenced the congressional 
intent behind the Amendment of the need to avoid piecemeal litigation 
of water rights and emphasized that comprehensiveness should include 
hydrologically connected groundwater.
223
 Although the cert petition was 
denied for lack of extensive consideration by other courts, perhaps now, 
nearly seventeen years after the Ninth Circuit’s decision, the time is ripe 
to re-address this issue. 
In Washington, there is even another reason not to follow the Ninth 
Circuit: the importance of water to tribal communities
224
 and the 
hesitancy of tribes to trust state court adjudications of water rights.
225
 
These factors argue in favor of including groundwater in general stream 
adjudications. Even though the United States Supreme Court promised 
exacting scrutiny should a state court abuse tribal water rights,
226
 
adjudications can “linger indefinitely in the lower courts,” waiting for 
the final judgment that is needed for appeal to the U.S. Supreme 
Court.
227
 State court adjudications of tribal water rights should therefore 
be allowed to proceed only where all the prerequisites for a waiver of 
federal sovereign immunity under the McCarran Amendment are met, 
including hydrological comprehensiveness. 
                                                      
222. Brief for the United States in Opposition at 10, Klamath Tribe v. Oregon, 516 U.S. 943 
(1995) (No. 95-151), 1995 WL 17047729 (citing the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in Dugan, 
Colorado River, and Eagle County to support the argument that comprehensiveness under the 
McCarran Amendment would require the inclusion of groundwater in general stream adjudications). 
223. Id. at 11 (“The United States and the Tribe will be forced to bring numerous federal or state 
court actions to address issues concerning competing claims to the same water, which necessarily 
will be left unresolved by Oregon’s incomplete proceeding.”). 
224. See Feldman, supra note 19, at 433 (stating “water is the blood of our tribes” (quoting Frank 
Tenorio, Epigraph to AM. INDIAN LAWYER TRAINING PROGRAM, INC., INDIAN WATER POLICY IN A 
CHANGING ENVIRONMENT: PERSPECTIVES ON INDIAN WATER RIGHTS, at 2 (Patricia Zell ed., 
1982))). 
225. Id. at 449 (“Indian water rights—no matter how critical to a tribe’s future, no matter how 
well inventoried, no matter how brilliantly defended by Government attorneys, cannot receive full 
protection in State court forums.” (quoting Senator Edward Kennedy in Indian Water Rights: 
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Practice and Procedure of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1976))). 
226. Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545, 571 (1983). 
227. Id. 
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B. Including Groundwater in General Stream Adjudications 
Comports with Congressional Intent in Passing the McCarran 
Amendment 
In passing the McCarran Amendment, Congress sought to prevent 
piecemeal litigation of federal reserved water rights.
228
 Subsequent U.S. 
Supreme Court cases have recognized Congress’ intent.
229
 Requiring that 
surface and groundwater be adjudicated together would be consistent 
with Congress’ intent to promote holistic, as opposed to piecemeal, 
litigation. General stream adjudications including both surface and 
groundwater rights will allow the federal government to litigate its water 
rights only once for each water source. Conversely, treating surface and 
groundwater separately would require the federal government to 
participate in multiple legal actions, with the possibility of decades 
lapsing between adjudications due to their high cost and extensive 
scope.
230
 
In Washington, the Yakima County Superior Court rejected 
hydrological comprehensiveness in the Acquavella adjudication based 
on the court’s interpretation of the McCarran Amendment.
231
 This 
interpretation, however, ignores Congress’ intent in passing the 
McCarran Amendment—to avoid piecemeal adjudications of federal 
water rights.
232
 It is only through comprehensive adjudication of both 
surface and groundwater that priorities and quantities of use in a 
hydrologically connected water source can be articulated with sufficient 
                                                      
228. United States v. Oregon, 44 F.3d 758, 769 (9th Cir. 1994) (“We agree that the McCarran 
Amendment was motivated in large part by the recognition of the interconnection of water rights 
among claimants to a common water source and the desire to avoid piecemeal adjudication of such 
rights.”). 
229. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 811–13 (1976); United 
States v. Dist. Court in and for the Cnty. of Eagle Colo., 401 U.S. 520, 525 (1971); Dugan v. Rank, 
372 U.S. 609, 618–19 (1963). 
230. See, e.g., BENNO BONKOWSKI, WATER RES. PROGRAM, STATE OF WASH. DEP’T OF 
ECOLOGY, PUB. NO. 09-11-017, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS: WATER RIGHTS ADJUDICATION 
WILL PROTECT WATER RIGHTS IN SPOKANE AREA 1 (June 2009), available at 
http://www.ecy.wa.gov/pubs/0911017.pdf (discussing the large amount of preparatory work that 
goes into an adjudication, the “importance and enormity of the task,” the expense of an 
adjudication, and the delay in time from the beginning of preparations for an adjudication and the 
actual filing of the case in court). 
231. Memorandum Opinion re: Motion to Join Parties or Dismiss the United States at 19, Dep’t 
of Ecology v. Acquavella, No. 77-2-01484-5 (Wash. Super. Ct. Mar. 12, 1985). This opinion is not 
available in most legal databases. It is on file with Washington Law Review.  
232. Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 819 (“The clear federal policy evinced by [the McCarran 
Amendment] is the avoidance of piecemeal adjudication of water rights in a river system.”). 
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legal clarity. This is necessary to enable holders of federal reserved 
water rights to enjoin interfering uses. 
As the Acquavella adjudication in Washington draws to a close after 
more than thirty years, a second adjudication for groundwater rights in 
the Yakima River Basin may be necessary.
233
 This further demonstrates 
the inefficiency of not adjudicating groundwater rights during the 
surface water adjudication. Before that proceeds, the Department of 
Ecology will likely begin an adjudication of the Spokane River area.
234
 
Any future general stream adjudication in Washington that includes 
federal reserved water rights should address both surface and 
groundwater use. This will guarantee compliance with the McCarran 
Amendment’s comprehensiveness requirement and ensure waiver of 
federal sovereign immunity for the adjudication.
235
 
CONCLUSION 
If a state wishes to adjudicate a federal water right in a general stream 
adjudication, then federal sovereign immunity must be waived under the 
McCarran Amendment. The United States Supreme Court has 
determined that the waiver of sovereign immunity is effective only when 
the adjudication is comprehensive, meaning that it covers all of the 
rights in the river system being adjudicated. The Court’s 
comprehensiveness requirement for the McCarran Amendment comports 
with Congress’ intent to avoid piecemeal adjudications of federal water 
rights. In addition, the tribal preference for a federal forum in water 
rights determinations further stresses the importance of only waiving 
sovereign immunity when a state adjudication is truly comprehensive. 
Scientists recognize the hydrologic connection between surface and 
                                                      
233. Judge Stauffacher noted that there were at least 19,000 groundwater claimants, a number 
which has surely grown since 1985. Acquavella, No. 77-2-01484-5, at 5; Memorandum from the 
Water Res. Advisory Comm., Yakima Basin Water Res. Agency, at 2 (July 18, 2007), available at 
http://www.yakimacounty.us/ybwra/2007_DIP_Final/Appendices%20A,%20C-J%5CJ%20Inchoate
%20Water%20Rights.doc. (“The Yakima Basin has been in the process of adjudicating surface 
water rights for the last thirty years. This has been conducted at great expense to the state and all 
parties involved. . . . Some discussion has centered on the need for future groundwater 
adjudication.”). 
234. BENNO BONKOWSKI, WATER RES. PROGRAM, STATE OF WASH. DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, PUB. 
NO. 09-11-017, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS: WATER RIGHTS ADJUDICATION WILL PROTECT 
WATER RIGHTS IN SPOKANE AREA 1 (June 2009), available at http://www.ecy.wa.gov/pubs/ 
0911017.pdf 
235. Although this Comment focused on the necessity of hydrologic comprehensiveness for a 
waiver of federal sovereign immunity under the McCarran Amendment, the principles of hydrologic 
continuity discussed support the inclusion of both surface and groundwater in any general stream 
adjudication regardless of whether federal reserved water rights are involved. 
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groundwater, and the law has increasingly come to acknowledge this 
link. A comprehensive adjudication under the McCarran Amendment 
should always include hydrologically connected surface and 
groundwaters. Without a requirement of hydrological 
comprehensiveness, a surface water adjudication would be incomplete. 
Numerous groundwater users would be left out of the adjudication and 
would not have clearly defined rights in respect to their connected 
surface water counterparts. This would result in the federal government, 
including tribes, having to litigate for groundwater rights separately. 
As Washington State prepares for new adjudications involving federal 
and tribal water rights, it is imperative that the adjudications cover both 
surface and groundwater in order to fulfill the comprehensiveness 
requirement of the McCarran Amendment. 
